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THE RIGHT TO COUNSEL IN POLICE INTERROGATION 
CASES: Miranda and Williams• 
The cases involving police elicitation of co_nfessions from a sus-
pect have been a source of great public concern. 1 One recent case, 
Brewer v. Williams ,2 is significant because it rejuvenated a theory 
of constitutional protection for suspects which had been dormant 
since the Supreme Court's decision in Escobedo v. Illinois. 3 It is 
also significant because to most observers the case appeared to 
concern issues of police interrogations under Miranda v. Arizona. 4 
Yet, the Court determined that Miranda was inapposite and stated 
that Williams rested on the sixth amendment's guarantee of the 
right to the assistance of counsel5 rather than on Miranda and the 
fifth amendment's privilege against compelled self-incrimination.6 
This article will consider some of the theoretical and practical 
ramifications of the Williams decision and compare its protections 
to the protections offered by Miranda. The article, focussing on the 
right to counsel, discusses the nature of the police conduct which is 
prohibited by each decision, the time at which the protections in-
volved become effective, and the standard by which a waiver of the 
rights will be measured. The article concludes that there may be 
significant differences in the application of the two cases and that a 
uniform rule based on the sixth amendment may be superior to the 
present approach. 
To understand the decision in Williams, it is important to be 
familiar with the facts 7 of the case. Pamela Powers was abducted 
*This article was developed from research done for Professor Yale Kamisar at the Univer-
sity of Michigan Law School. I wish to extend special thanks to him for his guidance in de-
veloping the theme of this article. 
1 Kamisar, Foreward: Brewer v. Williams -A Hard Look at a Discomfitting Record, 66 
GEO. L.J. 209, 209 (19n) [hereinafter cited as Kamisar, Williams-Record] ("In recent de-
cades few matters have split the Supreme Court, troubled the legal profession, and agitated 
the public as much as the police interrogation-confession cases."). 
2 430 U .s. 387 (1977). . 
3 378 U.S. 478 (1964). 
4 384 U.S. 436 (1966). Interestingly, the Iowa state courts had considered only the 
Miranda question. See State v. Williams, 182 N.W.2d 396 (Iowa 1970). 
5 The pertinent section of the sixth amendment provides: "In all criminal prosecutions, 
the accused shall ... have the Assistance of Counsel for his defense." U.S. CONST. amend. 
VI. 
• The ilfth amendment reads in part: "No person ... shall be compelled in any criminal 
case to be a witness against himself .... " U.S. CoNST. amend. V. 
7 This article will refer to the facts as reported by the Supreme Court. The actual facts are 
different in several important aspects. See Kamisar, Williams-Record, supra note I. 
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from a YMCA in Des Moines, Iowa on December 24, 1968. On De-
cember 26, Henry McKnight, an attorney in Des Moines, received 
a telephone call from Williams, then in Davenport, Iowa, who con-
fessed to involvement in the Powers case and asked for advice. 
McKnight told Williams to surrender to the Davenport police, 
which he did. The Davenport police read Williams his Miranda 8 
rights and informed the Des Moines police of the surrender. Detec-
tive Leaming and a fellow officer were dispatched to bring Wil-
liams back to Des Moines. While still in Davenport, Williams was 
arraigned. He consulted at that time with an attorney named Kelly. 
When Detective Leaming arrived, he repeated the Miranda warn-
ings and told Williams, "I want you to remember this [the war-
nings] because we will be visiting between here and Des Moines. " 9 
Kelly requested, but was refused, permission to ride with Wil-
liams. Kelly then reminded Detective Leaming of an agreement 
Leaming had made with McKnight not to interrogate WiHiams until 
their arrival in Des Moines. During the 160-mile trip Williams 
stated several times that "[w]hen I get to Des Moines and see 
McKnight I am going to tell you the whole story. " 10 Leaming and 
Williams had a wide-ranging discussion which culminated in Leam-
ing' s delivery of the so-called Christian Burial Speech 11 in which 
Leaming lamented the fact that they would be passing the place 
where the body was hidden but that the snow fall would soon cover 
the body so that she would never be found and her parents would 
be denied the opportunity to give her a decent Christian burial. Wil-
liams asked why Leaming believed they would be passing the loca-
tion of the body on the way back to Des Moines. Leaming re-
sponded that he knew the body was in the area of Mitchellville. 
This was a guess. Leaming closed the conversation by stating, "I 
don't want to discuss it further. Just think about it as we're riding 
8 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966), requires that a suspect be warned of his right to 
remain silent and his right to retained or appointed counsel. 
• Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. at 391. 
10 Id. at 392. 
11 Detective Leaming is reported to have made the following speech: 
I want to give you something to think about while we're traveling down the road 
.... Number one, I want you to observe the weather conditions, it's raining, it's 
sleeting, it's freezing, driving is very treacherous, visibility is poor, it's going to be 
dark early this evening. They are predicting several inches of snow for tonight and I 
feel that you yourself are the only person that knows where this little girl's body is, 
that you yourself have only been there once, and if you get a snow on top of it you 
yourself may be unable to find it. And, since we will be going right past the area on 
the way to Des Moines, I feel that we could stop and locate the body, that the par-
ents of this little girl should be entitled to a Christian burial for the little girl who 
was snatched away from them on Christmas [E]ve and murdered. And I feel we 
should stop and locate it on the way in rather than waiting until morning and trying 
to come back out after a snow storm and possibly not being able to find it at all. 
Id. at 392-93. 
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down the road. " 12 As the car approached Mitchellville, Williams 
directed the officers to the body. Williams never confessed to the 
murder in any way other than by his action of locating the body, 
but such an action is treated by the courts as confession. The Court 
stated that Williams was protected by his right to counsel and the 
speech was tantamount to an interrogation, thus violating that 
right. 13 The Court disagreed with the Iowa state courts, and upheld 
the federal court view that Williams had not waived his right to 
counsel. 14 
I. PROHIBITED POLICE CONDUCT 
Both Miranda and Williams have the same ultimate effect - the 
exclusion of self-incriminating remarks from the suspect's trial. 
Each accomplishes the task based on a different notion of what the 
police have done wrong. Thus, the two approaches may reach dif-
ferent results in different circumstances. 
Before discussing the theories of each case it is helpful to review 
the possible forms of police conduct which may be called into ques-
tion. The court often refers to the prohibited police conduct as "in-
terrogation." That word, however, may cover a broad range of ac-
tivities. This article instead will refer to questioning, inducement 
(or interrogation), and elicitation. Questioning is the asking of 
questions designed to produce self-incriminating responses. 15 In-
ducement is police conduct which includes not only questioning 
but also other forms of conduct which have the effect of coercing 
or compelling the suspect to incriminate himself. This conduct may 
be as horrifying as dropping a basin of the deceased's bones into 
the lap of the suspect,16 or as subtle as giving the suspect a pam-
phlet describing the dangers of carrying narcotics within one's 
body .1 7 To determine whether there has been inducement, the 
courts look for the presence of coercion. Because Miranda has had 
such an overwhelming impact in the confession area, and because 
the Miranda Court referred to the coercive police conduct as ''cus-
todial interrogation," 18 the word "interrogation" has come to be 
associated with inducement. 19 By contrast, elicitation encompas-
12 Id. at 393. 
13 Id. at 400. 
14 Id. at 401-06. 
15 The police may ask questions which do not have as their purpose the production of a 
self-incriminating response. The police may, for example, ask "administrative" questions. 
See Smith, The Threshold Question in Applying Miranda: What Constitutes Custodial Inter-
rogation?, 25 S.C.L. REV. 699, 704-05 (1974). 
1• Lyons v. Oklahoma, 322 U.S. 596 (1944). 
17 United States v. McCain, 556 F.2d 253 (5th Cir. 1977). 
18 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. at 444. 
19 See notes TI-82 and accompanying text infra. 
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ses a broader range of activities. It includes conduct that may or 
may not be coercive, but that is nevertheless calculated to produce 
a self-incriminating response. Custody, however, can add a coer-
cive aspect to any form of police conduct.20 
Massiah v. United States 21 provides an example of the distinc-
tion between inducement and elicitation, and of the confusion sur-
rounding these terms. Mr. Massiah had been indicted for smuggling 
narcotics into the country. Unbeknownst to him, his accomplice, 
Colson, agreed to assist the prosecution. Colson arranged a meet-
ing with Massiah which was recorded by federal agents. The com-
ments made by Massiah were excluded from his trial, as a violation 
of the sixth amendment. Although the Court referred to the police 
conduct as "surreptitious interrogation, " 22 there was no evidence 
of an interrogation in that there was no coercion. Massiah spoke of 
his own free will. It would be more accurate to describe the con-
duct as deliberate elicitation,23 since it evoked a self-incriminatory 
response without coercion. 
A. Brewer v. Williams 
It is difficult to determine the breadth of the proscribed conduct 
in Williams, since the Court's opinion established an interrogation 
requirement, and then determined the constitutional violation 
based on precedent which related to deliberate elicitation, not in-
terrogation. Specifically, the Court stated it would have found "no 
such constitutional protection [under the sixth amendment] ... if 
there had been no interrogation. " 24 On the other hand, the Court 
relied on the decision in Massiah which prohibited any deliberate 
elicitation of remarks by a federal officer after the suspect's in-
dictment.25 It is possible that the Court meant to describe the same 
conduct with the terms "interrogation" and "deliberate elicita-
tion." But, as noted, they have come to be differentiated by the 
presence of coercion. Thus, one question posed by Williams is the 
role coercion plays in the application of the sixth amendment.26 
20 See Dix, Undercover Investigations and Police Rulemaking, 53 Tux. L. REV. 203, 230 
(1975). 
21 377 U.S. 201 (1964). 
22 /d. at 206. 
23 /d. The reference to "surreptitious interrogation" may be explained by the fact that the 
court of appeals decision in Massiah, 307 F.2d 62 (2d Cir. 1962), dealt with the application of 
Spano v. New York, 360 U.S. 315 ( 1959). Spano involved an interrogation in that there was 
coercion. The majority in Massiah quoted Judge Hays' dissent from the Second Circuit de-
cision. It was Judge Hays, not the Supreme Court majority, who first used the phrase "sur-
reptitious interrogation." 307 F.2d at 69. 
2• 430 U.S. at 400 (emphasis added). 
25 Id. at 400-01. 
26 See generally Kamisar, Brewer v. Williams, Massiah and Miranda: What Is "lnterro-
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A review of the history of the application of the sixth amendment· 
to self-incrimination cases reveals the source of the confusion. The 
sixth amendment's application has rested on two interrelated 
analyses. The first is based on the view that police actions consti-
tute a critical stage of pre-trial proceedings and that the suspect is 
protected by the right to counsel. In line with this analysis, the 
Court has frequently stated that without the presence of counsel to 
investigate and prepare the accused's case, and to provide needed 
legal advice in the early, "critical" stages of a criminal prosecu-
tion, the right to counsel at trial is meaningless.27 Although the 
Court has used such reasoning to apply the right to counsel primar-
ily to judicial pre-trial proceedings, the theory could be extended to 
police actions as well, since the results of police activity can be as 
critical to the eventual trial as other activities.28 Under this theory, 
coercion is not particularly important. Voluntary but uncounselled 
statements made at pre-trial judicial proceedings can be excluded 
from use at the trial.29 Whether this holds true for police proceed-
ings will be explored below. 30 
The second basis for the application of the right to counsel to 
police interrogation cases is to resolve the problems of coercion as-
sociated with police interrogations. These problems relate to con-
duct that threatens the suspect's fifth amendment rights, although 
it was not until Miranda that the fifth amendment was declared ap-
plicable to police conduct.31 Prior to Miranda, the Court had relied 
on the voluntariness test to determine the admissibility of confes-
gation"? When Does it Matter?, 67 GEO. L.J. l (1978) [hereinafter cited as Kamisar, What 
Is Interrogation?]. 
27 See, e.g., Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 57 (1932), in which the Court stated: 
[D]uring perhaps the most critical period of the proceedings against these defen-
dants, that is to say, from the time of their arraignment until the beginning of their 
trial, when consultation, thorough-going investigation and preparation were vitally 
important, the defendants did not have the aid of counsel in any real sense, al-
though they were as much entitled to such aid during that period as at the trial it• 
self. 
28 Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. at 398 (citing Powell); Massiah v. United States, 377 U.S. 
201,205 (l964)(citingPowell). See also Spano v. Ne~ York, 360 U.S. 315,325 (l959)(Doug-
las, J ., concurring); Cicenia v. LaGay, 357 U.S. 504, 512 (1958) (Douglas, J ., dissenting); 
Crooker v. California, 357 U.S. 433, 441-48 (1958) (Douglas, J., dissenting). 
29 See, e.g., White v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 59 (1963). Professor Kamisar has suggested a 
helpful way to think of this. If the prosecutor were attempting to discover information from a 
defendent during the trial and did so by trickery, such information would probably be 
excluded even if it were voluntarily given. Interview with Yale Kamisar, Law Professor at 
University of Michigan, in Ann Arbor, Michigan (Feb. 19, 1979). 
30 See notes 53-69 and accompanying text infra. 
31 The Court previously had held that the compulsion proscribed by the fifth amendment 
referred to judicial compulsion (that is, compulsion exercised by the force of law) and not 
police compulsion, because the police had no right to punish a person who did not speak. 
Bram v. United States, 168 U.S. 532 (1897); Kamisar, A Dissent from the Miranda Dissents: 
Some Comments on the "New" Fifth Amendment and the Old "Voluntariness" Test, 65 
MICH. L. REV. 59, 65, 77-83 (1966). 
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sions.32 This test was criticized because the Court could not be 
sure of the facts since the cases often presented swearing contests 
between the police and the suspect. 33 Even if the facts could be de-
termined, the test was also criticized as too illusive. No one was 
sure what "voluntary" meant.34 
The application of the sixth amendment's right to counsel to 
police interrogations was seen by some members of the Court as a 
device to resolve the problems with the voluntariness test. The 
right was thought applicable because the production of a confes-
sion has such an enormous impact on the eventual trial.35 More 
importantly, the right to counsel was believed capable of improving 
the conditions of the police interrogations. Counsel could inform a 
suspect of his rights, deter the police from engaging in nefarious 
conduct, and provide an independent source of facts. 36 Although 
several justices desired to impose limitations on police conduct 
through the sixth amendment, Miranda, a case in which both fifth 
and sixth amendment interests culminated, suggests that the pri-
mary concern of the Court was defendant's fifth amendment inter-
est- the right to be free from compelled self-incrimination.37 Thus, 
the presence of coercion or compulsion plays an important role in 
the application of the right to counsel under this analysis of the 
sixth amendment. 
The view that the presence of counsel in police interrogations 
was desirable gained majority acceptance in 1964 in Massiah 38 and 
32 See Brown v. Mississippi, 2'I7 U.S. 278 (1936). In determining whether a confession 
was vohmtary, the Court took into consideration possible violations of fifth amendment 
interests. Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1, 7 (1964). 
33 See, e.g., Crooker v. California, 357 U.S. 433, 441-48 (1958) (Douglas, J., dissenting). 
34 Culombe v. Connecticut, 367 U.S. 568 (1961), is a good example of the problem with the 
voluntariness test. Justice Frankfurter's 67 page plurality opinion descnbes in great detail 
the factors to be used in measuring voluntariness. Three other Justices agreed with the 
standards set forth but reached the opposite result. See generally Kamisar, A Dissent from 
the Miranda Dissents, supra note 31; Kamisar, What is an Involutary Confession?, 17 RUT-
GERS L. REV. 728 (1963). 
35 See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. at 466 (quoting Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643,685 
(1961)): 
Without the protections flowing from ... the rights of counsel, "all the careful 
safeguards erected around the giving of testimony, whether by an accused or any 
other witness, would become empty formalities in a procedure where the most 
compelling possible evidence of guilt, a confession, would have already been ob-
tained at the unsupervised pleasure of the police." 
36 See Spano v. New York, 360 U.S. 314, 325-26 (1959) (Douglas, J., concurring); Crooker 
v. California, 457 U.S. 433, 441-48 (1958) (Douglas, J., dissenting). 
37 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. at 439: 
[W]e deal with the admissibility of statements obtained from an individual who is 
subjected to custodial police interrogation and the necessity for procedures which 
assure that the individual is accorded his privilege under the Fifth Amendment to 
the Constitution not to be compelled to incriminate himself. 
38 377 U.S. 201 (1964). 
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Escobedo v. Illinois. 39 These two cases, however, demonstrate the 
differences in the two justifications for the application of the sixth 
amendment. Voluntariness and the fifth amendment were not at 
issue in Massiah, since the suspect spoke of his own free will.40 
Massiah is, therefore, best analyzed as an application to police 
procedures of a traditional sixth amendment theory of the right to 
counsel.41 The Court held that just as the suspect cannot be denied 
the right to counsel during critical stages when he most needs the 
right, so can the police be proscribed from purposefully circum-
venting the right once the right has commenced.42 
By contrast, Escobedo involved the use of coercive psychologi-
cal ploys to produce a confession. Escobedo knew his attorney was 
outside the interrogation room and requested to speak with him, 
but his request was denied. The police engaged in a long, secret 
interrogation which culminated with their bringing an accomplice 
into the interrogation room and Escobedo claiming that it was the 
accomplice, rather than himself, who pulled the trigger. 43 The 
Court analyzed the case in terms of the right to counsel and held 
39 378 u .s. 478 (1964). 
• 0 See text accompanying notes 21-23 supra. 
41 See United States v. Ash, 413 U.S. 300,312 (1973); Milton v. Wainwright, 407 U.S. 371, 
381-82 (1972) (Stewart, J., dissenting) ("Massiah marked no new departure in the law. It 
upset no accepted prosecutorial practice .... In no case before Massiah had this Court, at 
least since Powell v. Alabama, ever countenanced the kind of post-indictment police inter-
rogation there involved, let alone ever specifically upheld the constitutionality of any such 
interrogation .... "). When Massiah was decided, several commentators believed it dealt 
with the meaning of compulsion under the fifth amendment and not with the right to counsel. 
Enker & Elsen, Counselfor the Suspect: Massiah v. United States and Escobedo v. Illinois, 
49 MINN. L. REv. 47, 57 (1964); The Supreme Court, 1%3 Term, 78 HARV. L. REV. 143,221 
(1964). Enker and Elsen questioned the right to counsel reasoning in Massiah by noting that 
if Colson had volunteered to help the state after he had his conversation, the right pre-
sumedly would not have arisen. Enker & Elsen, supra at 56-57. Thus, they argue, the real 
meaning of Massiah is that the state somehow drew a confession out of Massiah and such 
activity is more closely related to the fifth amendment. Williams, however, clearly rejects 
the fifth amendment analysis of Massiah. 430 U.S. at 397. The Court in Massiah could be 
understood to assume that after a given point the suspect requires the assistance of an attor-
ney in his interactions with the state. Since Massiah had passed that point, it was his right to 
have his attorney advise him as to any communications made with the state. In turn, the 
state was proscribed from engaging in such conversation by surreptitious means. Massiah 
did not have a right to advice concerning all possible conversation, but was protected against 
state action that initiates or gathers information. 
42 The Court viewed indirect interrogations as posing a greater threat to constitutional 
rights than secretive police practices: 
It is true that in the Spano case [Spano v. New York, 360 U.S. 315 (1959)] the de-
fendant was interrogated in a police station, while here the damaging testimony was 
elicited from the defendant without his knowledge while he was free on bail. But, as 
Judge Hays pointed out in his dissent in the Court of Appeals, "if such a rule is to 
have any efficacy it must apply to indirect and surreptitious interrogations as well 
as those conducted in the jail house. In this case, Massiah was more seriously im-
posed upon ... because he did not even know that he was under interrogation by a 
government agent." 
Massiah v. United States, 377 U.S. 201, 206 (1964) (emphasis added). 
43 Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. at 482-83. Escobedo was held for murder under the Il-
linois felony-murder rule. 
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that once the police had focused their investigation on a suspect, 
that suspect was entitled to the protections of the right to coun-
sel.44 Nevertheless, the true concern of the Court appeared to be 
the protection of the suspect from the compulsion of police interro-
gation.45 In Miranda the Court analyzed Escobedo as a case de-
signed to protect fifth amendment rights,46 and later cases have 
completely stripped Escobedo of any sixth amendment value.47 
A review of the cases indicates the difficulty in analyzing Wil-
liams. While the decision claims to rely on Massiah, the facts are 
more similar to Escobedo. Moreover, the justices discuss in the 
opinion the coercive impact of the Christian Burial "interroga-
tion, "48 despite the seeming irrelevance of coercion under Mas-
siah. The best interpretation of Williams is as a traditional sixth 
amendment case. This is apparent by noting that the case could 
have been decided under Miranda but was not. Williams was 
clearly in custody49 and the Court found the Christian Burial 
Speech to be tantamount to an interrogation. The Court could, ac-
cordingly, have found under Miranda that Williams was impro-
perly subjected to custodial interrogation.50 The fact that the Court 
specifically rejected Miranda and appeared to draw a line between 
the fifth and sixth amendment interests indicates that Williams 
does not rely on the Miranda theory of interrogation, but on the 
sixth amendment analysis of Massiah. The overriding concern of 
Miranda is the element of compulsion inherent in custodial interro-
gation. 51 In contrast, the Massiah doctrine affects police conduct 
which is often, but need not be, coercive. Thus, if the Court was 
primarily concerned with the application of Massiah rather than 
Miranda to the facts in Williams, the decision proscribes deliberate 
elicitations and the use of the world "interrogation" is mislead-
ing.52 The presence of coercion should, therefore, have little direct 
•• Id. at 490-91. 
•• See Enker & Elsen, supra note 41, at 61. 
•• Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. at 465. 
47 Kirby v. Illinois, 406 U.S. 682,689 (1972) ("[T)he Court in retrospect perceived that the 
'prime purpose' of Escobedo was not to vindicate the constitutional right to counsel as such, 
but, like Miranda, 'to guarantee full effectuation of the privilege against self-incrimination 
.. . '.").See also Beckwith v. United States, 425 U.S. 341 (1976). 
•• See note 13 supra. 
49 See notes 8-14 supra. 
• 0 What the result would have been had it been a Miranda case is an open question. Com-
pare Israel, Criminal Procedure, the Burger Court, and the Legacy of Warren Court, 75 
MICH. L. REv. 1320, 1385-86 (lm) (the confession would be admissible under Miranda) 
with Kamisar, What Is Interrogation?, supra note 26, at 72-74 (the confession would be in-
admissible under Miranda). 
· 51 See note 37 supra. 
52 See Karnisar, What Is Interrogation?, supra note 26, at 33-34. One could argue that 
"interrogation" has a different meaning when applied to the sixth amendment, as opposed 
to the fifth amendment. There is, however, no reason to engage in such semantic confusion 
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impact on the determination that the right to counsel has been de-
nied. 
The broadest interpretation of "deliberate elicitation" suggests 
that any statement by the suspect to the state is inadmissible~ This 
interpretation is based on the idea that there is an analogy between 
police and judicial pre-trial proceedings. The voluntariness of a 
statement made at a pre-trial judicial proceeding would, under this 
interpretation, not be relevant;53 if the right to counsel were not ex-
tended during such a proceeding, the statement could not be used. 
Some courts have so interpreted Massiah. 54 
The breadth of such a conclusion is troubling to some. It 
suggests, for example, that a statement which is merely overheard 
might be excluded on the basis of the suspect's sixth amendment 
right. 55 Furthermore, such a conclusion is in conflict with the 
statement in Miranda that voluntary statements are not to be 
excluded.56 These concerns may have troubled the Court and they 
therefore required that the police must take some action that inter-
feres with the suspect' s ability to use his right to counsel. The 
police may approach the suspect only through his attomey57 or in a 
manner consistent with the suspect's right to invoke the sixth 
when the phrase "deliberate elicitation" more accurately describes the proscribed conduct 
under Miranda. 
53 See White v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 59 (1963). 
54 Shortly after Massiah was decided, the Court decided McLeod v. Ohio, 301 U.S. 356 
(1964). McLeod was a one sentence reversal of an Ohio Supreme Court opinion which had 
held that Massiah did not apply to a voluntary confession made in a face to face confronta-
tion. State v. McLeod, l Ohio St. 2d 60, 203 N.E.2d 349 (1964). Several courts relied on 
Massiah and McLeod to hold that, after indictment, even voluntary statements which were 
not elicited by the police could be excluded in the absence of a waiver of the right to counsel. 
United States ex rel. O'Connor v. New Jersey, 405 F.2d 632 (3rd Cir. 1969), cert. denied 
sub. nom. Yeagerv.O'Connor, 395 U.S. 923 (1968); Hancock v. White, 378 F.2d 479 (I st Cir. 
1967). 
The Ohio courts seem to have interpreted McLeod to mean that, once indicted, the sus-
pect is entitled to be informed of his right to counsel before interrogation. State v. Arrington, 
3 Ohio St. 2d 61,209 N.E.2d 207 (1965), cert. denied, 383 U.S. 906 (1966). 
55 One court has held that overheard statements are admissible. See United States v. 
Hearst, 563 F.2d 1331 (9th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 1000 (l978)(rejecting a clai·m by 
Patty Hearst that the introduction of a tape recording made of a discussion between Hearst 
and a friend via an intercom system at the jail was a violation of Williams), discussed in note 
flJ infra. 
56 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. at 478. Other courts share this interpretation by holding 
that Massiah must be read in the light of Miranda, which allows voluntary statements to. be 
admitted. See United States v. Crisp, 435 F.2d 354 (7th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 402 U.S. 947 
(1971); State v. Blizzard, 278 Md. 556, 366 A.2d 1026 (1976) (collecting cases). The effect of 
such a reading is to completely subsume Massiah into the Miranda analysis. See United 
States v. Mandley, 502 F.2d ll03 (9th Cir. 1974); Blizzard, 278 Md. at 568, 366 A.2d at 1032 
(''An overwhelming majority of the courts in this country have been restrictive in their ap-
plication of Massiah and McLeod."). This appeared to be the predominant theory of Mas-
siah's status until Williams distinguished Massiah from Miranda. 
57 See Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. at 415 (Stevens, J., concurring) ("[T]he lawyer is the 
essential medium through which the demands and commitments of the sovereign are com-
municated to the citizen."). 
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amendment as a protection from police inquiries. 58 
The_ nature of the interference depends upon the circumstances 
of police involvement. In Massiah the police had interfered because 
they subjected Massiah to an attempt to get information in which 
his ability to assert his right to counsel was rendered meaningless 
by the secrecy of elicitation. In Williams, however, the suspect 
realized he was confronting the police. The Court found that the 
right had been circumvented because the Christian Burial Speech 
had such an impact on the psyche of Williams that he was rendered 
incapable of rationally deciding when he should interpose his right 
to counsel.59 The dissenters disagreed and argued that the Speech 
was not coercive and that the past assertions by Williams indicated 
his ability to cut himself off from the police.60 Thus, contrary to the 
notion that deliberate elicitations do not depend on the presence of 
coercion, the Court may be indicating that in face to face confron-
tations with the police, a suspect's right to counsel is circumvented 
only by coercive police conduct. This is the narrowest possible in-
terpretation that can reconcile the Court's conflicting notions of 
the need for "interrogation" and its reliance on Massiah. Deliber-
ate elicitation refers broadly to deceptive actions by police, but 
would reach no further than interrogation when the suspect recog-
nizes who he is confronting. This narrow interpretation is trou-
bling, however, because, as noted above, in the circumstances of 
Williams it is not appreciably different from the protection against 
compulsion already provided by Miranda. 61 
A middle ground can be·established for interpreting Williams, in 
which all statements are not excluded but where the exclusion is 
broader than Miranda. It is certainly possible, for example, that an 
interrogation which was undertaken while the suspect was not in 
custody would constitute a violation of the right to counsel but 
•• See United States v. Crisp, 435 F.2d 354,358 (7th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 402 U.S. 947 
(1971) ("[T]he crucial feature of both Massiah and McLeod was the deliberate acquisition of 
information by police from a suspect under circumstances preventing his effective exercise 
or waiver of his right to counsel .... "). 
•• 430 U.S. at 408 (Marshall, J., concurring) ("The detective demonstrated once again that 
the efficiency of the rack and the thumbscrew can be matched, given the proper subject, by 
more sophisticated modes of persuasion."). 
60 430 U.S. at 418 (Burger, J., ·dissenting); 430 U.S. at 433-37 (White, J., dissenting); 430 
U.S. at 439-41 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). 
61 One might argue that the presence of compulsion in Williams serves a different purpose 
than it does in Miranda. The argument thus far has been that the compulsion in Williams has 
the effect of rendering a suspect incapable of asserting his right to counsel. One could argue 
that such coercion is different from the coercion necessary to compel a self-incriminating 
remark. This is certainly true where the suspect does not realize he is speaking to a state 
agent, as in Massiah. As to face to face confrontations, the argument is meaningless. First, 
the police pressure which creates a confession also creates a pressure to refrain from assert-
ing one's right. Second, Miranda is not limited to combatting the police pressure to confess. 
It also refers to the pressure to relinquish one's right, See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. at 467 
("In order to combat these pressures and to permit a full opportunity to exercise the 
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would not trigger Miranda. 62 It is also possible that Williams 
means to include a broader range of activities under the rubric of 
"deliberate elicitation'' when the suspect is in custody than is cov-
ered by Miranda. 63 Both of these examples raise the issue, which 
remains unresolved in Williams, as to how much the police must do 
before their activity becomes an elicitation. The different descrip-
tions of proscribed conduct reflect the differences in focus between 
the Miranda and Williams decisions. Under Miranda the focus is 
on the presence of compulsion which violates the fifth amendment. 
Coersion is a necessary condition for such a proscription but not a 
sufficent condition because there must also be custody. Under Wil-
liams the focus is on the interference with the right of the suspect 
to interpose his attorney between himself and the state. A wider set 
of activities falls under this proscription and coersion is a sufficient 
condition, but not a necessary condition. 
The application of Miranda in custodial circumstances was 
based on the assumption that the inherently coercive pressures of 
custodial interrogation may cause many suspects to relinquish their 
rights. The notion that the police can render a suspect incapable of 
interposing his right to counsel in face to face confrontations with-
out coercion appears to rest on an assumption that the suspect does 
not always act in his own best interest. 64 A contrary assumption 
privilege against self-incrimination, the accused must be adequately and effectively ap• 
prised of his rights and the exercise of these rights must be fully honored.") (emphasis ad-
ded). 
•• See United States ex rel. Chabonian v. Liek, 366 F. Supp. 72 (E.D. Wis. 1973). Miranda 
relies on the synergistic effects of both custody and interrogation which create an inherently 
coercive situation. The difficulty posed regarding Williams is whether the Court will require 
proof of coercion in fact or whether the mere asking of a question will constitute a deliberate 
elicitation. 
The Supreme Court case which came closest to reaching this issue is Hoffa v. United 
States, 385 U.S. 293 (1966). Hoffa was overheard by a government agent planning the brib-
ery of the Test Fleet jury. Hoffa argued his right to counsel had attached because, under 
Escobedo, the police had focussed the investigation on him. Once the right attached, hear-
gued, the statements overheard by the agent were inadmissable under Massiah. The Court 
argued in rejecting Hoffa's Miranda claim that there was no inherent coercion. The Court 
rejected the right to counsel argument, but appeared to do so on the theory that the right had 
not attached and not on the grounds that no right to counsel argument was available. In a 
footnote the Court commented that had Hoffa been indicted for bribery, the decision would 
have been more· difficult. 
Any police action. which was not preceeded by a warning of the right to counsel, even if 
not in custodial surrounding, should, of course, constitute deliberate elicitation, since the 
police would be taking advantage of the ignorance of a suspect and thus rendering him in-
capable of effectively using his right. McLeod was held to mean the police must warn a sus-
pect of his right to counsel. See note 54 supra. 
63 Compare text accompanying note 65 infra with text accompanying notes 86-90 infra. 
64 This is not an unreasonable assumption. The basis of the right to counsel is, presuma-
bly, to assure the suspect that he will be represented in the best possible way. See Johnson 
v. 2.erbst, 304 U.S. 458, 462-63 ("[The Sixth Amendment] embodies a realistic recognition 
of the obvious truth that the average defendant does not have the professional legal skill to 
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suggests that so long as the suspect is informed that he has a right 
he will know how to use· it in the absence of compelling pressures 
to relinguish the right. How completely the Court accepts this as-
sumption will have an effect on which police activities it will clas-
sify as deliberate elicitations and what actions will constitute a 
waiver of the right to counsel. 
A significant example of the breadth of Williams and of the con-
fusion over the word "interrogation" is provided by the situation 
in which a suspect is placed in a jail cell with a "jail cell plant. " 65 
The Massiah-Williams rule proscribes, once the adversary pro-
ceedings have commenced, the use of incriminating evidence 
gatheredby the jail cell plant since Massiah, the precedent Wil-
liams relied upon, excluded the information that had been gathered 
for all practical purposes by a jail cell plant. The fact that the secret 
agent in Massiah operatedin an automobile, not a jail cell, makes 
no difference. Nevertheless, the Second Circuit in a recent case 
held that the presence of a jail cell plant was not a violation of Wil-
liams because use of a jail plant dd not constitute an interroga-
tion. 66 The Fourth Circuit has disagreed and overruled the use of 
an admission in such a circumstance. 67 The presence of a jail plant 
is a deliberate elicitation of information because it places the sus-
pect in a situation in which the police can take advantage of normal 
social pressures to speak68 to a person inclose proximity and simul-
taneously render the suspect incapable of interposing his attorney 
between himself and the state.69 
The requirement that the elicitation be ''deliberate" may limit 
the scope of Williams. The majority seemed troubled that Detec-
protect himself when brought before a tribunal with power to talce his life or liberty."). Such 
protection is no less necessary when the suspect is confronted by the police rather than by 
the prosecutor at trial. See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. at 469-74. 
•• See Kamisar, What ls Interrogation?, supra note 26, at 55-69. 
•• Wilson v. Henderson, No. 78-2015 (2d Cir. Sept. 20, 1978). 
67 Henry v. United States, No. 77-2338 (4th Cir. Dec. 26 1978). 
88 See Dix, Undercover Investigations and Police Rulemaking, supra note 20, at 230; 
Driver, Confession and the Social Psychology of Coercion, 82 HARV. L. REV. 42, 44-46 
(1968) ("[T]o be physically close is to be psychologically close. The situation has a structure 
emphasizing to the persons involved the immediacy of their contact .... ••). 
69 The Second Circuit in Wilson v. Henderson, No. 78-2015 (2d Cir. Sept. 20, 1978), ar-
gued that Massiah did not render inadmissible all voluntary statements, but only those 
which the police have elicited or, according to Williams, which were products of interroga-
tion. Thus, the Court confused the notions of police action which forces the suspect to re-
spond (interrogation) with action which interferes with the assertion of the suspect's right 
(elicitation). This confusion is evident from the misuse of precedent. The cases cited for the 
premise that Massiah did not affect all voluntary statements all involved face to face con-
frontations. It has been noted not only that these present a difficult application of the Mas-
siah holding, but that in any case the focus should be on the ability of the suspect to use his 
attorney as a shield. While in face to face cases the courts may search for activity which 
prods the suspect, in surreptitious cases, such as the jail cell plant and Massiah, the state has 
automatically removed the suspect's capacity to use his right to counsel by the very fact of 
secrecy. 
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tive Leaming knew Williams had retained an attorney but neverthe-
less attempted to compel a statement by removing him from the 
presence of the attomeys.70 Justice Blackmun, in dissent, argued 
that the no-passenger rule was reasonable and therefore the isola-
tion was not deliberate.71 This suggests that the Court will have to 
resolve whether deliberateness means specific intent to gather the 
information or a general intent to commit an act which has area-
sonable likelihood of producing a confession whether or not the 
police officer recognizes such a likelihood. 72 
The foregoing discussion interprets Williams as adopting the 
right to counsel approach to problems of self-incrimination. This 
The Wilson decision then turns for support to cases involving surreptious investigations: 
United States v. Hearst, 503 F.2d 1331 (9th Cir. Im), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 1000 (1978), 
and United States v. Fiorvanti, 412 F.2d 407 (3rd Cir.), cert. denied sub nom. Fiorvanti v. 
Yeager, 396 U.S. 860 (1969). Fiorvanti is inapplicable since the suspect had not been in-
dicted and thus his right to counsel had not attached. 
Hearst is more difficult to analyze. While in jail, Patty Hearst was recorded by the police 
speaking to a visitor on a two way communication device used by all prisoners and visitors. 
The Ninth Circuit summarily dismissed Hearst's argument because the mere presence of the 
recording device was not an elicitation. The same argument might be made in Wilson - that, 
unlike Massiah, the government agent merely listened and did not suggest the area of con-
versation. First, however, it is not clear that the agent in Massiah suggested an area of con-
versation, see Kamisar, What ls Interrogation?, supra note 26, at 42 n.283 ("I submit that 
the facts in Wilson are constitutionally indistinguishable from those presented in Massiah. 
There was no finding or any indication that Colson [the agent in Massiah] 'interrogated' 
Massiah or asked him a single question."). Second, even if such a distinction existed it 
would be dangerous to rely on it. The cases would be reduced to swearing contests between 
the suspect and the agent as to who first mentioned the issue of the crime. Third, it is more 
consistent with the Massiah-Williams doctrine of protecting the suspect's ability to inter-
pose his attorney that any such communication be prohibited. The police must be proscribed 
from circumventing the relationship between suspect, attorney and the state whether by 
electronic or personal means. Finally, the Hearst court noted that the prisoners were aware 
of the recording device. Although the court did not analyse this fact, it can be argued that 
Hearst's knowledge of the police presence meant the police had to do more than collect the 
information to breach the right to counsel. This view must not be overextended. It is no 
protection to the right to counsel to inform a suspect that he will be recorded whenever he 
speaks and to whomever he speaks. 
These arguments were accepted by the Fourth Circuit in Henry v. United States, No. 77- · 
2338 (4th Cir. Dec. 26, 1978). The court noted that Massiah, McLeod v. Ohio, 301 U.S. 356 
(1964), and Beatty v. United States, 389 U.S. 45 (1967), all suggest a broad reading of the 
proscription against police elicitations. The court also noted that use of the word "interroga-
tion" in Williams was not meant to be a restriction on the holding of Massiah. 
70 Williams' Davenport attorney, Kelly, asked to ride back to Des Moines with Williams. 
This offer was refused. The Court noted that this allowed Leaming to act upon Williams in 
isolation. 430 U.S. at 399. Isolation is generally accepted as a critical element in an effective 
interrogation. See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. at 449. The Court also noted that Leaming 
had agreed with both attorneys not to interrogate Williams. Although the Court did not give 
the agreement the force of a contract, it did note that the agreement reinforced the deliber-
ateness of Learning's conduct. 430 U.S. at 401 n.8. 
71 Brewer V. Williams, 430 U.S. at 438-39. See also United States v. Hinton, 543 F.2d 
1002 (2d Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 980 (Im) (no violation of Massiah found where 
state officers questioned suspect and responses were overheard by federal agents because 
the state officers were unaware of the federal indictment). 
72 See Kamisar, What ls Interrogation?, supra note 26, at 9 ("It seems to me ... that so 
long as the police conduct is likely to elicit incriminating statements and thus endanger the 
privilege, it is police 'interrogation' regardless of its primary purpose or motivation .... "); 
Beatty v. United States, 389 U.S. 45 (1967) (reversing a lower court holding that if the sus-
pect arranges to meet with the government agent it is not a deliberate elicitation). 
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approach proscribes any deliberate elicitation of remarks by the 
police once the right has attached. Deliberate elicitation appears to 
mean actions which interfere with the suspect's right to interpose 
his attorney between himself and the state. When the suspect is 
unaware that he is communicating to a state agent he is robbed of 
this right. If the suspect is aware that he is addressing a state agent, 
the Court must decide what forms of police activity will constitute 
deliberate elicitations. The decision will be affected by whether a 
suspect in such circumstances is capable of acting in his own best 
interests and asserting his right to counsel or whether a suspect will 
be presumed to need an attorney's assistance. 
B. Miranda v. Arizona 
Miranda held that suspects subjected to custodial interrogations 
must be given certain wamings.73 The prohibited conduct, in the 
absence of warnings, is the custodial interrogation. 74 The Court 
observed that such interrogations were inherently coercive and 
warnings were therefore necessary to assure the suspect the ability 
to assert his rights. 75 Since the custody issue has been considered 
extensively, 76 the focus of the present discussion is upon the inter-
rogation factor. 
By narrowly construing the interrogation requirement, some 
courts have limited the application of Miranda. 11 For example, one 
73 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. at 444. 
74 After a person has asserted one of his rights under Miranda the protection may be 
broader. The Court stated in Miranda that "any evidence that the accused was threatened, 
tricked, or cajoled into a waiver will, of course, show that the defendant did not voluntarily 
waive his privilege." 384 U.S. at 476. If the defendant does not voluntarily waive, any result-
ing confession is inadmissible. 
75 See note 37 supra. 
78 See generally NATIONAL DISTRICT ATTORNEYS ASSOCIATION, CONFESSIONS AND IN-
TERROGATIONS AFTER MIRANDA 5-29 (1975); Kamisar, "Custodial Interrogation" Within 
The Meaning of Miranda, in INSTITUTE OF CoNTINUING LEGAL EDUCATION, CRIMINAL 
LAW AND THE CONSTITUTION I (1968); Graham, What is "Custodial Interrogation?'' 
California's Anticipatory Application of Miranda v. Arizona, 14 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 59 
(1966). 
77 See, e.g., United States v. Davis, 527 F.2d 1110(9th Cir. 1975); United States v. Hodge, 
487 F.2d 945 (5th Cir. 1973). See also United States v. Burgard, 551 F.2d 190(8th Cir. 1977); 
United States v. Springer, 460 F.2d 1344 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 873 (1972). C. 
WRIGHT, FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE (Criminal)§ 76, at 113 (1969), explains the limi-
tations in terms of an expansive definition of voluntary statement: 
[f]he breadth of the exception for volunteered statements ... seems to include ... 
the statement of a person who has not been given the benefits of warnings and 
counsel so long as he is not interrogated. If so, the police, so long as they ask no 
questions, could deliberately hold ·a person in custody without giving him the 
Miranda warning, and confront him with the victim of the crime, or perhaps other 
evidence of it, in the hope that he would spontaneously say something incriminat-
ing. 
But see Kamisar, What Is Interrogation?, supra note 26, at 14 n.85 (arguing that Professor 
Wright's view is too limited). 
126 Journal of Law Reform [VOL. 12:1 
court held that telling a suspect that the fingerprints found on the 
dead body matched his fingerprints was not an interrogation but a 
"firm one-way conversation. " 78 This holding suggests that "inter-
rogation" under Miranda is limited to police questioning. How-
ever, this limitation ignores the intent, if not the letter, of Miranda. 
The Court adopted the Miranda rule not to halt police questioning 
per se, but to dispell the "badge of intimidation" inherent in the 
police dominated atmosphere of custodial interrogations. 79 The 
Court was concerned with any coercive conduct which renders the 
suspect incapable of asserting his rights. Indeed, several of the in-
terrogative techniques described by the Court in Miranda do not 
involve the question/answer process.80 By focussing on the inter-
rogation issue, the Williams decision supports the view that 
Miranda covers more than questioning. The dissenters in Williams 
argued that the Christian Burial Speech was not a question and 
therefore not an interrogation. 81 By finding the Speech to be an in-
terrogation, the majority buries the myth that such acts are not"in-
terrogations.' '82 
Another apparent limitation on the scope of Miranda concerns 
the source of the coercion. Miranda clearly applies when the coer-
cion stems from dealing with a known police officer. 83 When the 
coercion is from sources other than the police, however, the 
applicability of Miranda is less clear. One court, for example, held 
that asking the father of a suspect to convince the suspect to con-
78 United States v. Pheaster, 544 F.2d 353 (9th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1099 
(1977). But see Kamisar, What Is Interrogation?, supra note 26, at 20 n. I 15 ("[I]f you wish 
Miranda were overruled, the Davis-Pheaster approach is the next best thing."). 
79 Some courts, particularly the Pennsylvania Court, have been astute in the protection of 
the Miranda doctrine by looking _beyond the presence of a question to whether the police 
actions were likely to produce a confession. See Commonwealth v. Mercier, 45 I Pa. 211, 
302 A.2d 337 (1973); Commonwealth v. Hamilton, 445 Pa. 292, 285 A.2d 172 (1971); Com-
monwealth v. Simala, 434 Pa. 219, 252 A.2d 575 (1969). See also United States v. Clark, 499 
F.2d 802 (4th Cir. 1974); Combs v. Wingo, 465 F.2d 96 (6th Cir. 1972); United States ex rel. 
Doss v. Bensinger, 463 F.2d 576 (7th Cir. 1972); United States v. Barnes, 432 F.2d 89, 90-91 
(9th Cir. 1970); McCORMICK'S HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF EVIDENCE §152 (E. Cleary ed. 
1972). 
80 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. at 457 n.26, 454 (pointing out the incriminating signifi-
cance of the suspect's refusal to talk), 455 (resorting to "deceptive strategems such as giving 
false legal advice"), 450 (displaying "an air of confidence in the suspect's guilt"). 
81 Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. at 439-40 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). See also 430 U.S. at 
433, 434 (White, J., dissenting). 
82 Compare United States v. McCain, 556 F.2d 253 (5th Cir. 1977) (Court uses Williams to 
expand Miranda and finds that the action of officers who gave an informational pamphlet 
concerning the dangers of hiding narcotics in one's body constituted conduct tantamount to 
an interrogation and therefore proscribed by Miranda) and United States v. Jordan, 557 
F.2d 1081 (5th Cir. 19TI), with Owens v. Commonwealth, 235 S.E. 2d 331 (Va. 1977) (refus-
ing to apply the broader notion of interrogation in Williams to a Miranda case because the 
cases protect different rights). 
83 Miranda usually refers to "custodial police interrogation." See, e.g., Miranda 
v.Arizona, 384 U.S. at 450. 
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fess constituted illegal interrogation under Miranda. 84 By contrast, 
another court held that asking questions of a suspect's wife in the 
presence of the suspect, which the suspect answered, was not an 
interrogation of the suspect. 85 
Courts have also split on the question whether the use of a jail 
cell plant violates Miranda. 86 It should be recalled that under the 
better interpretation of Williams, the use of the jail cell plant vio-
lates the sixth amendment.87 This conclusion follows because the 
focus of the right to counsel is on the ability of the suspect to use 
his right once he has it. The focus of Miranda, however, may be 
somewhat different and therefore its application to this situation is 
uncertain. Miranda has been viewed as no more than a prophylac-
tic device to protect the fifth amendment's privilege against com-
pelled self-incrimination.88 Under such an assumption one com-
mentator has argued that Miranda does not cover the jail cell plant 
situation89 because Miranda was designed to combat the inherent 
compulsion of inducements engaged in by recognized police offi-
cials. Specifically, the references to inherent compulsion in 
Miranda go to the belief of most suspects that they must answer 
the police or that the police can do them much harm if they do not 
answer. These basic instincts, combined with the means to em-
phasize them through the interrogation devices described in 
Miranda, give the police significant albeit inherent powers of com-
pulsion. These pressures are absent in the situation in which the 
suspect does not recognize the interrogator as a police officer.90 
84 United States ex rel. Chabonian v. Liek, 366 F. Supp. 72 (E.D. Wis. 1973). 
85 Haire v. Sarver, 437 F.2d 1262 (8th Cir. 1971). The decisions on this issue often tum on 
whether the interrogator was an agent of the police. See United States v. Gugliaro, 501 F.2d 
68 (2d Cir. 1974); United States v. Brown, 466 F.2d 493 (10th Cir. 1972); State v. O'Kelley, 
181 Neb. 618, 150 N.W.2d ll7 (1967). 
86 Compare State v. Travis, 360 A.2d 548 (R.I. 1976), with United States v. Fioravanti, 412 
F.2d 407 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 637 (1969). 
87 See note 61 supra. 
88 Brewerv. Williams, 430 U.S. at 397; United States v. Mandujano, 425 U.S. 564,581 n.6 
(1976); Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U.S. 433, 438-39 (1974); Kirby v. Illinois, 406 U.S. 682,688 
(1972). 
89 Kamisar, What Is Interrogation?, supra note 26, at 55-69. 
This is not to suggest that the fifth amendment does not apply as well. If the undercover 
agent beats a confession out of the suspect it will be viewed as compelled self-incrimination. 
An interesting and unresolved question is how the Court might treat the use of the interroga-
tion techniques referred to in Miranda by an undercover agent. 
•• The interrelationship of this issue with the above issue of Miranda's application when a 
suspect is questioned by someone other than a police officer is clear. If the jail cell plant is 
not a violation of Miranda because the suspect is unaware of the presence of the police, then 
it follows that if the suspect is questioned by his father, or a murder victim's mother, then 
the lack of "police blue" means such techniques are not violations of Miranda. Professor 
Kamisar has taken such a view. Kamisar, What Is Interrogation?, supra note 26, at 45, 48. 
This article will eventually suggest that Miranda be viewed not solely as a prophylactic 
device but as an application of the sixth amendment for the limited purpose of protecting 
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The limitations on Miranda described above, along with the re-
quirement that the interrogation must be custodial, suggest that 
Williams involves a broader proscription of police conduct. The 
focus in Williams upon the capacity of the suspect to interpose 
counsel, rather than upon the compelling nature of the police con-
duct, suggests that conduct which is arguably not coercive may 
nevertheless constitute the sort of trickery which is protected 
against by the right to counsel. If one accepts the broader view of 
interrogation under Miranda, there appears to be little difference 
between Miranda and Williams in face to face confrontation under 
custodial circumstances. The differences are more strongly evident 
in surreptitious or non-custodial circumstances, where Miranda 
protection may not apply, but where the Williams protections may. 
II. TIME OF COMMENCEMENT 
The differences in the scope of protection offered by Williams 
and Miranda become relevant only after the protections are opera-
tive. Yet, Miranda and Williams apparently operate on different 
timetables. 
A. Brewer v. Williams 
The question of when the right to counsel attaches was not a crit-
ical issue in Williams because the state conceded that the right had 
already attached at the time in question.91 The Court, nevertheless, 
stated the rule that the right to counsel attaches at or after the time 
that judicial proceedings have been initiated.92 Linking the right to 
counsel to the initiation of judicial proceedings finds support in the 
cases that apply the right to counsel theory to pre-trial proceed-
ings. In Powell v. Alabama, 93 the Court held that the right to coun-
sel should apply during any "critical period" when investigation 
and consultation were essential to protect the fairness of the trial. 
In these cases, however, the Court was not concerned with police 
conduct. Rather, the Court's concern was with the imbalance 
created in the judicial system by the absence of an effective advo-
fifth amendment rights. Under such an assumption it can be argued that Miranda was not 
intended to combat inherent compulsion alone, but that it was meant to counteract any gov-
ernmental compulsion, of which inherent compulsion is the worst case. The Miranda warn-
ings are not suggestions to the suspect of rights he can assert, but are descriptions of rights 
he already has, of which he may remind the police. Thus, the violation of the right to counsel 
in Miranda should be tested under the same focus as that in Williams and both are violated 
by the jail cell plant. 
91 Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. at 399. 
92 Id. at 398. 
93 'l2.7 U.S. 45 (1932). 
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cate for the suspect during the early stages of the case, and the 
danger of rendering meaningless the right to counsel at trial. 94 
The Court has extended its time of attachment rule to certain 
cases involving police conduct. For example, in United States v. 
Wade, 95 the Court held that the right to counsel applied to a cor-
poreal lineup. In Kirby v. Illinois, 96 however, the Court limited the 
Wade decision to lineups occuring after the accused had been in-
dicted. Indictment was the judicial proceeding which triggered the 
sixth amendment right to counsel.97 
Arguably the "critical period" language of Powell is inappropri-
ate in the self-incrimination cases, since the elicitation of a confes-
sion before judicial proceedings have begun is as harmful to the 
suspect as a confession obtained afterwards. The Kirby decision, 
however, suggests that only after judicial proceedings have com-
menced has the prosecutor committed himself to prosecute. 98 This 
commitment, according to Kirby, is what the sixth amendment 
focusses on in guaranteeing the right to counsel in all ''criminal 
prosecutions. " 99 The difficulty with this reasoning is that it does 
not go far enough in analyzing the threat which the prosecutor can 
pose to the suspect. To the prosecutor, the prosecution may begin 
long before judicial proceedings commence. The prosecutor could 
decide to develop the evidence for his case before he begins any 
judicial proceedings, 100 and take advantage of the inherently co-
ercive power of custodial interrogations. Kirby further suggests 
that the aid of an attorney is not necessary before judicial proceed-
ings have commenced because at that point the suspect does not 
face the "intricacies" of the criminal law .101 This reasoning, how-
•• Id . 
•• 388 U .s. 218 (1967). 
96 406 u .s. 682 (1972). 
97 Id. at 689. The Court stated: 
The initiation of judicial criminal proceedings is far from a mere formalism. It is 
the starting point of our whole system of adversary criminal justice. For it is only 
then that the government has committed itself to prosecute, and only then that the 
adverse positions of government and defendant have solidified. It is then that a de-
fendant finds himself faced with the prosecutorial forces of organized society, and 
immersed in the intricacies of substantive and procedural crimin!ll law. It is this 
point, therefore, that marks the commencement of the "criminal prosecutions" to 
which alone the explicit guarantees of the Sixth Amendment are applicable. 
Id. at 689-90 (footnote omitted). 
os 1d. 
•• See note 5 supra. Kirby does not consider why criminal "prosecutions" under the lan-
guage of the sixth amendment commence when judicial proceedings have begun, while crim-
inal "cases" under the language of the fifth amendment begin with custodial police interro-
gations. 
100 In United States v. Mandujano, 425 U.S. 564 (1976), for example, the suspect argued 
that the prosecutor purposefully delayed his indictment to take advantage of the suspect's 
lesser rights at the pre-indictment stage. 
101 See note 97 supra. 
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ever, does not and should not apply to police interrogations. In 
Massiah, for example, the suspect was not confronted with any in-
tricacies of law, but was held to be protected by the right to coun-
sel. To the suspect, the prosecution no doubt commences once he 
believes the prosecutor desires to imprison him. 102 
If the expressed reasoning of Kirby does not explain the rule it 
adopts, perhaps the Court felt that it had to place some limitation 
on the right to counsel, but felt it could not state its decision in such 
terms.103 Similarly, the commencement of judicial proceedings 
may have been perceived by the Kirby Court as a point of public 
focus on the judicial system and, therefore, the rule laid down gave 
the appearance of being just.104 Due to its arbitrariness, the Kirby 
102 Cf. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. at 477 ("It is at this point [of custodial inter-
rogations] that our adversary system of criminal proceedings commences .... "). 
103 Grano, Kirby, Biggers and Ash: Do Any Constitutional Safeguards Remain Against 
the Danger of Convicting the Innocent?, 72 MICH. L. REV. 717, 732-33 (1974), suggests the 
Court felt constrained by practical consideration: 
At most, therefore, Kirby, if limited to pure sixth amendment analysis, might have 
adopted the custody approach [requiring an attorney if the suspect is in custody] 
.... [T]his approach would have posed a serious threat to the present police prac-
tice of conducting prompt on-the-scene identifications. It can reasonably be as-
sumed that the Supreme Court was not prepared to deprive the police of the flexi-
bility. Kirby's reinterpretation of the sixth amendment may, therefore, have been 
dictated by the impractical consequences that would have followed a custody ap-
proach. 
One must ask, however, if this reasoning is readily applicable to the Williams situation. Ar-
guably the police should be free to question a suspect in the absence of counsel to make a 
quick determination whether the suspect would be pursued as a potentially guilty party. 
That freedom is already restricted by the Miranda decision. Thus, the applicability of the 
Kirby rule to Williams turns on the mechanical application of the sixth amendment rule 
rather than on an analysis of the purpose the protection fulfills in police interrogations. 
10• Kamisar, What Is Interrogation?, supra note 26, at 82-83. 
There are alternatives to the Kirby rule. In Escobedo the Court held that the right to coun-
sel commenced when the investigation first focussed on the suspect. 378 U.S. at 490-91. 
That standard was short-lived. Miranda reinterpreted Escobedo as involving the fifth 
amendment and stated that "focus" meant custodial interrogation. 384 U.S. at 444 n.4. In 
Hoffa v. United States, 385 U.S. 293 (1966), the Court summarily rejected an argument by 
Hoffa that his right to counsel had been violated when an undercover agent overheard a 
conversation between Hoffa and his lawyer. Hoffa argued that the right to counsel com-
menced when the investigation focussed on him. The final nail in the coffin for Escobedo 
was Beckwith v. United States, 425 U.S. 341 (1976), which explicitly rejected the "focus" 
test. 
Another alternative is the so-called New York rule. In New York the right to counsel 
commences once an attorney enters the proceedings. People v. Hobson, 39 N.Y.2d 479,348 
N.E.2d 894, 384 N.Y.S.2d 419 (1976). This rule has some federal support in a footnote in 
Miranda, which stated that Escobedo's sixth amendment rights were violated when the 
police refused to allow Escobedo's attorney to speak with him despite the request. Miranda 
v. Arizona, 384 U.S. at 465 n.35. See Rothblatt & Pitier, Police Interrogation: Warnings and 
Waiver - Where Do We Go from Here?, 42 NOTRE DAME LAW. 479, 494-96 (1967). The ap-
proach has, however, been rejected by lower federal courts. See United States v. Masullo, 
489 F.2d 217 (2d Cir. 1973); United States v. Lemonakis, 485 F.2d 941 (D.C. Cir. 1973); 
Davis v. Burke, 408 F.2d 779 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 856 (1969). 
One commentator has argued against the use of the New York rule. Kamisar, What Is 
Interrogation?, supra note 26, at 86-91. The objection to the New York rule is that it gives 
added protection to a person wealthy enough to afford a lawyer or fortunate enough to have 
others obtain a lawyer for him. The court in Masullo stated that this would be an impetus for 
organized criminals to appoint "house counsel." One means ofreducing the impact of such 
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rule may be both too broad and too narrow in the police interroga-
tion context. It is too narrow because it leaves the police free to act 
before judicial proceedings have begun and to use the fruits of such 
actions at trial. 105 It is too broad because once judicial proceedings 
have begun the rule may eliminate the possibility of police action to 
elicit a confession even if the actions do not coerce the suspect. 
In Williams, the Court noted that Williams' right to counsel had 
commenced because a warrant had been issued for his arrest and 
he had been arraigned. 106 While there is little question that ar-
raignment is sufficiently judicial to trigger the right to counsel,107 
some courts have suggested that an arrest warrant alone may be 
sufficient.108 In considering an earlier point in time, such as the 
time of a warrantless arrest, problems of delineating limits arise. If 
police action alone were sufficient to trigger the right to counsel, 
arguably the Court should return to a rule which focusses on the 
nature of the police conduct, such as the custodial interrogation 
test or "focus" test. 109 Since these tests have been rejected by the 
Court and are contrary to the Kirby rule, the Court is unlikely to 
adopt one of these tests. 
The right to counsel under Williams is triggered once judicial 
proceedings have commenced against the suspect. These proceed-
ings may take the form of an indictment or possibly an arrest war-
rant. There seems to be little justification for this rule except for 
the desire of the court to limit the potency of the right to counsel. 
B. Miranda v. Arizona 
Miranda becomes operative when the suspect is subjected to 
custodial interrogation.11° This can occur either before or after the 
inequalities would be to make an attorney available to anyone who is taken into custody. 
One state has already done so. See N .M. Stat. Ann. § 31-15-12c (1978). The controversy 
which Miranda has engendered, however, makes further expansion of this device unlikely. 
10
• See United States v. Maxwell, 383 F.2d 437,441 (2d Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 
1057 (1968). The government agent who gathered the incriminating statements in Massiah 
carried on similar activities against the other co-conspirators. The Second Circuit noted, 
however, that since these other co-conspirators were not under indictment at the time the 
agent met them, they were not protected by Massiah. 
10• Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. at 399. 
107 Coleman v. Alabama, 399 U.S. 1 (1970). 
108 See P-atler v. Slayton, 503 F.2d 472 (4th Cir. 1974); State v. McCorgary, 218 Kan. 358, 
543 P.2d 952 (1975), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 867 (1976); People v. Flores, 236 Cal. App. 2d 
807, 46 Cal. Rptr. 412 (1965), cert. denied, 384 U.S. 1010 (1966). See also Terry v. Ohio, 392 
U.S. 1, 26 (1968) ("An arrest is the initial stage of criminal prosecution. It is intended to 
vindicate society's interest in having its laws obeyed .... "). But see Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 
U.S. 103 (1975) (a determination of probable cause after detention is not a critical state re-. 
quiring the presence of counsel); Kamisar, What Is Interrogation?, supra note 26, at 85 
n.503. 
10
• If the Court did not rely on a test which focussed on function rather than procedure, it 
would create an arbitrary inequality among suspects and might discourage the use of a war-
rant. See United States v. Duvall, 537 F.2d 15 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 426 U.S. 950 (1976). 
110 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. at 444. 
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initiation of judicial proceedings. If it occurs afterwards, then pre-
sumably the Williams doctrine would also apply and the suspect 
could choose whichever approach best served his needs. 
The custodial interrogation standard raises a theoretical prob-
lem. The Miranda decision mandates a right to counsel warning.11 1 
Yet, according to Williams, there can be no right to counsel before 
judicial proceedings have commenced. The co-existence of these 
different standards might be attributed to the Court's interpretation 
of Miranda as a fifth amendment case rather than as an application 
of the sixth amendment.11 2 Thus, Miranda could be read to provide 
for a right to counsel but not the right to counsel. 
One can argue that this position is too narrow a reading of 
Miranda. It is true that Miranda's primary purpose appears to be 
the development of a prophylactic rule which will protect fifth 
amendment rights. But that does not mean the sixth amendment is 
uninvolved. Massiah, for example, reflects a history of using the 
sixth amendment to protect fifth amendment rights. The mere fact 
that only one right is involved - self-incrimination - rather than 
the larger spectrum of rights typically associated with the need for 
counsel, does not mean that the right to counsel is therefore limited 
to that one right. For example, the right to counsel in corporeal 
lineup cases protects the due process right to a fair trial.11 3 The 
right to counsel in these cases, however, is not considered to be a 
prophylactic rule protecting due process rights, but rather a right 
unto its own. 
It is more reasonable to recognize Miranda as an application of 
the sixth amendment for the limited purpose of counteracting the 
threat which a compelled confession could have on the eventual 
trial.11 4 This view would avoid much of the theoretical confusion 
created by the conflict between the Williams and Miranda rules as 
to when the right to counsel attaches. The Williams-Kirby rhetoric, 
requiring judicial proceedings to have commenced, would have to 
give way to allow the right to counsel to commence at custodial in-
terrogations - a point at which the suspect, probably believes the 
prosecution has commenced. The purpose of the limitation to judi-
cial proceedings, that is, not overexpanding the right to counsel, is 
served by allowing the right to exist only in those circumstances 
where there exists an inherent threat to fifth amendment inter-
ests.115 
111 Id. 
112 Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. at 397; United States v. Mandujano, 425 U.S. 564, 581 
n.6 (1976); Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U.S. 433, 438-39 (1975); Kirby v. Illinois, 406 U.S. 682, 
688 (1972). 
113 United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218 (1967). 
114 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. at 466. See text accompanying notes 155-57 infra. 
115 The Kirby decision itself would have to be re-thought. The desirability of limiting the 
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In the present state of the law, there appears to be two different 
approaches to determining when the right to counsel commences. 
Under Williams, the right to counsel attaches once judicial pro-
ceedings have commenced. Under Miranda, the "right to.counsel" 
commences during custodial interrogations and such activities may 
occur before or after judicial proceedings have been initiated. 
III. WAIVER 
The ease with which an accused may waive his rights is a mea-
sure of the strength of that right. 116 Generally, the standard for 
waiver reflects the amount and force of evidence which the Court 
will require before it will find that a waiver occurred. In Johnson v. 
Zerbst117 the Court declared that a waiver of a constitutional right 
must be a knowing and intelligent relinquishment of a known right. 
Nevertheless, the standard for waiver may differ in different cir-
cumstances. 
A. Brewer v. Williams 
The waiver issue is the critical issue in Williams. The state ar-
gued that Williams was aware of his right to counsel and therefore 
his voluntary actions constituted a waiver of the right. 118 The 
Court rejected this reasoning and held that the state courts had un-
constitutionally placed the burden of proof on Williams rather than 
on the prosecution.11 9 If the only difficulty were the burden of 
proof, Williams would have been a simple case. But the Court went 
further to describe what standard of waiver should be applied by 
the lower courts. The precise standard is difficult to ascertain. On 
the one hand, the court stated that the standard for waiver before 
trial was the same as that at trial.120 On the other hand the Court 
described the proscribed conduct in a manner which suggested a 
lesser standard.121 
The strictest standard for waiver which the Court in Williams 
might have adopted requires the presence of an attorney to waive 
right to counsel may be justified on the basis of the importance of on-the-scene identifica-
tions and the availability of alternative means of proof of the accuracy of the identification 
technique for the defense. See Note, Pretrial Rightto Counsel, 26 STAN. L. REV. 399 (1974). 
The hybrid approach suggested here has the salutary effect of directing the courts' atten-
tion to the hazards of police conduct rather than to the abstractions of the need for counsel 
after judicial proceedings have commenced. See Kamisar, What Is Interrogation?, supra 
note 26, at 81. 
116 People v. Hobson, 39 N.Y.2d 479,484,384 N.Y.S. 2d 419,422,348 N.E.2d 894,898 
(1976) ("Indeed, it may be said that a right too easily waived is no right at all."). 
111 304 U.S. 458, 464 (1938). 
11
• Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. at 401-02. 
11
• Id. at 404. 
uo Id. 
12 1 Id. at 405. 
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the sixth amendment right. In his dissent, Chief Justice Burger ar-
gued that the logic of the majority opinion dictated this result. 122 
The majority responded that they need not reach that issue since 
they could find the absence of a waiver regardless of the presence 
of an attorney .123 Nevertheless, the idea of requiring presence of 
counsel warrants consideration. 
There are two bases for the argument that an attorney must be 
present before right to counsel can be waived. First, it has been 
argued that Williams should be interpreted to mean that after a 
given point the suspect is presumed to need the assistance of coun-
sel in any interaction with the state, as a protection against all de-
liberate elicitations.124 If this is true, it is reasonable that the deci-
sion to waive the right to counsel should also only be made after 
consultation with an attorney. A person who is incapable of direct-
ing his own affairs in interactions with the state must certainly be 
incapable of independently deciding whether he could use the as-
sistance of counsel.1 25 
Second, the majority opinion in Williams suggests that the 
standard for waiver before trial is the same as the standard at 
trial.126 In Faretta v. California ,127 the Court stated the standard to 
be that the defendant must be "made aware of the dangers and dis-
advantages of self-representation, so that 'he knows what he is 
doing and his choice is made with eyes open.' " 128 Arguably this 
standard will never be met by someone acting alone outside of the 
presence of ajudicial officer. During ajudicial proceeding an inde-
pendent judicial officer can explain the dangers and disadvantages 
to the defendant. During a police interrogation only the police and 
an attorney are realistically available to make such explanations. 
The presence of an attorney is necessary, for it would be unreason-
able to rely on the police to explain the very means by which the 
suspect may avoid their inquiries.129 
122 430 U.S. at 419 (Burger, C.J., dissenting). 
123 Id. at 405-06. 
124 See notes 65-70 and accompanying text supra. 
12
• See People v. Dorado, 62 Cal. 2d 338, 351, 398 P.2d 361, 369-70, 42 Cal. Rptr. 169, 
177-78 (1965) ("The defendant who does not ask for counsel is the very defendant who most 
needs counsel."), cited with approval in Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. at 471. 
126 430 U.S. at 404 ("[l]t was incumbent upon the State to prove 'an intentional relin-
quishment or abandonment of a known right or privilege' .... This strict standard applies 
equally to an alleged waiver of the right to counsel whether at trial or at a critical stage of 
pretrial proceedings."). 
127 422 u .s. 806 (1975). 
128 Id. at 835. 
129 Kamisar, Kauper's Judicial Examination of the Accused Forty Years Later-Some 
Comments on a Remarkable Article, 73 MICH. L. REv. 15, 25 (1974) ("Chief Judge Bazelon 
has put it less kindly: "A system that places reliance on police warnings places[s] a mouse 
under the protective custody of the cat.' ''). 
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Chief Justice Burger argued that this requirement is inconsistent 
with the Faretta holding. It is not inconsistent, however, if Faretta 
is limited to the at-trial situation or if one interprets Faretta as al-
lowing a person to dismiss his attorney after a first consultation in 
the police interrogation situation. The Chief Justice also objected 
to the requirement of consultation before waiver because it "oper-
ates to 'imprison a man in his privileges,' ... It denigrates an indi-
vidual to a nonperson whose free will has become hostage to a 
lawyer." 130 It is difficult to understand how consultation would 
subject a suspect to the desires of his attorney if the suspect retains 
the ability to dismiss his attorney. Perhaps the Chief Justice be-
lieves an attorney has an undue control over his client. If so, the 
issue in Williams would appear to be whether the Court prefers the 
control of the suspect's attorney over the control the police can 
exert. That the police can exercise such control was acknowledged 
by the Court in Miranda. Moreover, the requirement of an attor-
ney's presence is not unreasonable. The New York courts have re-
cently reaffirmed their commitment to such a rule. 131 
The majority in Williams indicates, however, that the Court does 
not intend to require the presence of counsel before a valid waiver 
will be found. The Court suggests, in its description of what Detec-
tive Leaming did wrong, that a lesser standard of waiver may oper-
ate in interrogations: 
Despite Williams' express and implicit assertion of his 
right to counsel, Detective Leaming proceeded to elicit in-
criminating statements from Williams. Leaming did not 
A third argument can be made for the presence of an attorney before a waiver. The Code 
of Professional Responsibility states that: 
During the course of his representation of a client a lawyer shall not ... com-
municate or cause another to communicate on the subject of representation with a 
party he knows to be represented by a lawyer in that matter unless he has the prior 
consent of the lawyer representing such other party or by law is authorized to do 
so. 
ABA, CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY Disciplinary Rule 7-104(1) (1977). By view-
ing the prosecutor as a lawyer, some have argued that once a suspect is represented it is 
unethical to approach him in the absence of his attorney. United States v. Thomas, 474 F.2d 
llO (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 412 U.S. 932 (1973); United States v. Springer, 460 F.2d 1344 
(7th Cir. 1972) (Stevens, J., dissenting). Others have stated that this is no more than an ad-
ministrative rule which they refuse to apply. Springer, id. (majority opinion). 
130 Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. at 419. 
131 People v. Hobson, 39 N.Y.2d 479, 384 N.Y.S.2d 419, 348 N.E.2d 894 (1976). See 
McCORMICK'S HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF EVIDENCE §153, at 334 (E. Cleary ed. 1972) 
("The New York rule seems more appropriate. While it is in theory possible for an accused 
to form the mental state required for a waiver without consultation with an attorney who is 
already in the case, the.danger of interrogators using this as a means of encouraging waivers 
for impermissable purposes seems sufficient to justify a general rule requiring that if an ac-
cused is represented by counsel, he may not thereafter be interrogated without counsel's 
presence unless he waives this right after consultation with counsel and in counsel's pres-
ence."). 
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preface this effort by telling Williams that he had a right to 
the presence of a lawyer, and made no effort at all to ascer-
tain whether Williams wished to relinquish that right. The 
circumstances of record in this case thus provide no rea-
sonable basis for finding that Williams waived his right to 
the assistance of counsel.132 
This language suggests that a waiver might have been possible if 
Leaming had given Williams an additional warning of his sixth 
amendment right and had asked if Williams wished to relinquish 
that right. Such activities, however, certainly do not amount to an 
explanation of the disadvantages of proceeding pro se. Further-
more, given the impact of the interrogative device used, the Christ-
ian Burial Speech, such additional comments would probably have 
had little impact on Williams' state of mind.133 An express request 
for a waiver would be a helpful standard because the Court would 
not have to assume the suspect's intent. But in Williams even an 
express waiver would have been tainted by the coercive impact of 
the interrogation. 
It remains uncertain whether the majority intended their descrip-
tion to constitute a minimal requirement for a waiver, or merely a 
statement that they could find no waiver despite the absence of 
counsel. If the Court shares the fears of Chief Justice Burger, it 
may refuse to require the presence of an attorney. Perhaps the 
Court will accept evidence that the suspect could determine his 
own best interests but set a demanding standard for such evidence 
in the face of coercive techniques employed by the police. The evi-
dence should be more than the mere presence of a warning and 
perhaps even more than an express waiver .134 
The issue of the extent to which a suspect must be aware of his 
own best interests divided the majority and dissent in Williams. 
The dissenters suggested that, as long as the suspect knew that he 
had the right to counsel and was able to assert the right, any sub-
sequent confession represents a waiver of the right. 135 Justice 
White noted that Williams had assert<;:d his right several times be-
fore the Christian Burial Speech and was no less capable of re-
-132 430 U.S. at 405. 
133 See Kamisar, Williams-Record, supra note I. Professor Kamisar argues that there 
was not a single speech but a series of questions and pleas by Detective Leaming. There is 
some evidence of this in the majority opinion's notation that Williams asserted his right sev-
eral times. See text accompanying notes 8-14 supra. A single additional warning at any one 
point probably would have had little effect. 
u• Id. 
135 Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. at 418 (Burger, C.J., dissenting); id. at 433 (White, J., 
dissenting). 
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asserting his right thereafter .136 This viewpoint is suggestive of the 
voluntariness test: if the suspect knows his rights, the Court need 
only ask if the confession was voluntary. 137 A more meaningful in-
terpretation of the requisite knowledge for waiver is that the sus-
pect must understand not only that he has a right but also the po-
tential benefits which the presence of counsel could provide. This 
interpretation is consistent with the standard of waiver expressed 
in Faretta - that the suspect (defendant) will be allowed to pro-
ceedpro se only ifhe is aware of the dangers. 138 This interpretation 
also avoids the pitfalls of the voluntariness rule. 139 
This division over the issue of the standard for waiver is also re-
flected in the scope of proscribed conduct suggested by the major-
ity and dissent. The dissenters' interpretation of the standard for 
waiver would allow a broad range of police conduct. Only coercive 
conduct that threatened to produce an involuntary confession 
would be proscribed. As noted above, the dissenters did not be-
lieve that the Christian Burial Speech was coercive. 140 To the 
majority, however, it appears that the critical determination was 
whether Williams understood the potential benefits of counsel. 
Any police conduct that interferred with the suspect's assessment 
130 Id. 
137 It is interesting to note, however, that Chief Justice Burger distinguished the voluntari-
ness test, quoting from Shnecklothe v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 238 n.25 (1973): 
[T)he question whether a person has acted "voluntarily" is quite distinct from the 
question whether he has "waived" a trial right. The former question, as we made 
clear in Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. [742,] 749, can be answered only by exa-
mining all the relevant circumstances to determine if he has been coerced. The lat-
ter question turns entirely on the extent of his knowledge. 
430 U.S. at 418. 
Chief Justice Burger believed this standard was fulfilled because Williams knew he had 
the rightto counsel, the Court did not question his mental competence, and Williams knew 
that leading the police to the body would incriminate himself. None of these facts, however, 
indicate a knowledge of the benefits which the presence of counsel might provide. This is 
presumably the "knowledge" to which Shnecklothe referred. Furthermore, the Court 
clearly does suggest a limitation of Williams' mental competence by finding that the Christ-
ian Burial Speech was an interrogation. To accept Chief Justice Burger's dissent and also 
accept the fact that the Speech was an interrogation is to suggest that the Court need only 
ask if the suspect's mental competence was retained after the inducement by the police. As 
noted in the text, this is no different from the voluntariness test. Chief Justice Burger then 
argues that no interrogation was proven "simply because it [the Speech] was followed by an 
incriminating disclosure." 430 U.S. at 419-20. This states the view that if the confession 
were not the result of the Speech it would therefore be admissible. This viewpoint is no 
different than the view that the confession was voluntary. Furthermore, it is difficult.to be-
lieve that the Speech was not intended to elicit the confession (and not merely a chance pre-
cursor), because the majority quotes Detective Learning's testimony admitting his intent. Id. 
at 339. The issue in Williams was not the presence of a confession, but the manner in which 
the police produced the confession. See id. at 408 (Marshall, J ., concurring) ("It is this inten-
tional police misconduct -not good police practice - that the Court rightly condemns."). 
138 See note 112 supra. 
139 See notes 32-34 supra. 
140 See note 60 and accompanying text supra. 
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of those benefits will constitute an elicitation in violation of the 
right. A suggestion by the police, for example, that it would be 
more "decent" if the suspect confessed, while not necessarily 
coercive, is a recommendation by the police that the suspect not 
assert the right to counsel.141 Such a suggestion should constitute 
an elicitation, and, therefore, proscribed conduct. 
B. Miranda v. Arizona 
The primary impact of Miranda was to require the police to warn 
a suspect of his rights and obtain a waiver of those rights before 
subjecting him to custodial interrogation. There is, however, a sec-
ond level Miranda right that controls the possibility of waiver after 
the right to silence or the right to counsel have been asserted. 
Under Miranda, an assertion of the right to silence or to counsel 
affects the standard for waiver, at least according to lower court 
interpretations of that decision. If the right is never asserted, a 
court may find that there was an implied waiver of the right - that 
is, that the actions of the accused effectuated a waiver of his rights 
without an express statement.142 Once a right is asserted under 
Miranda, however, the courts may apply a stricter standard. If the 
suspect asserts his right to silence, under Michigan v. Mosley 143 
the police may interrogate the suspect as long as the police 
scrupulously observe the suspect's right to cut off questioning. 
Mosley suggests that by answering subsequent questions the sus-
pect waives his right to silence. Although this is an implied waiver, 
it will be carefully scrutinized by the courts to assure the freedom 
of the suspect to reassert his desire to stop the questioning. 
141 It is conceivable that the statements by the police have no effect upon the judgement of 
the suspect and are, therefore, not proscribed. It should be the state's burden to prove this. 
The Court may have an occasion to consider such proof in Rhode Island v. Innis (R.I. Aug. 9 
1978), cert. granted, 47 U.S.L.W. 3566 (Feb. 20, 1979) (No. 78-1076). In that case the suspect 
asserted his right to counsel under Miranda and during the ride to the police station after an 
arrest passed a school for handicapped children. An arresting officer commented, "God for-
bid one of them [the children] might find a weapon with shells and they might hurt them-
selves." See N .Y. Times, Feb. 27, 1979, at B7, col. I. The case does not, apparently, involve 
the right to counsel under Williams, but the issue is the same. Once the right to counsel 
began the police should have been proscribed from activity which deliberately suggested 
that the suspect not assert his right. See Kamisar, What ls Interrogation?, supra note 26, at 
78 n.461 ("A forceful argument can be made that once a suspect asserts his Miranda right to 
counsel he is essentially in the same position as one whose Massiah right to counsel has 
attached."). 
142 Blackmon v. Blackledge, 541 F.2d 1070, 1072 (4th Cir. 1976); United States v. Mar-
childon, 519 F.2d 337,343 (8th Cir. 1975); United States v. Boston, 508 F.2d 1171 (2d Cir. 
1974), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 1001 (1975); United States v. Johnson, 466 F.2d 1210 (8th Cir. 
1972), cert. denied, 410 U.S. 916 (1973); United States v. Ganter, 436 F.2d 364,370 (7th Cir. 
1970); Mitchell v. United States, 434 F.2d 483 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 867 (1970); 
Bond v. United States, 397 F.2d 162 (10th Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 1035 (1969). See 
also NATIONAL DISTRICT ATTORNEYS ASSOCIATION, CONFESSIONS AND INTERROGATIONS 
AFTER MIRANDA 50-51 (1975). 
143 423 U.S. 96 (1975). 
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If a suspect asserts his right to counsel, the standard of waiver to 
be applied is less certain. Miranda stated that "[i]f an individual 
states that he wants an attorney, the interrogation must cease until 
an attorney is present. " 144 If the police claim that the suspect con-
sulted his attorney but later made a confession, the Court noted 
that "a heavy burden rests on the government to demonstrate that 
the defendant knowingly and intelligently waived his privilege 
against self-incrimination and his right to retain or appoint coun-
sel. " 145 The lower courts have split over whether the burden is so 
heavy as to require the presence of an attorney before waiver .146 
If the Supreme Court considers the issue, it seems unlikely that it 
will require the presence of an attorney for a waiver under 
Miranda. It could have decided the issue under Williams, but 
suggested a lesser standard.147 Therefore, if the right to counsel 
does not require the presence of an attorney for a waiver, it is im-
probable that the Court would find that the prophylactic rule of 
Miranda requires such a presence. 
In his dissent to Williams, Justice White argued that a waiver 
under Williams should be no different than a waiver under Miranda 
and that the latter could be found by implication from the actions of 
the accused.148 From this he argued that Williams had waived his 
right to counsel. This implied waiver standard for Miranda is trou-
bling. First, the implied waiver standard ignores the impact of 
police action in custodial surroundings. The right to counsel allows 
the suspect to intelligently choose his course of action.149 Once the 
suspect asserts the right to counsel under Miranda, or once the jud-
icial system presumes that the suspect is incapable of proceeding 
144 384 U.S. at 474. 
145 Id. at 475. 
146 The Fifth Circuit has held that the heavy burden is impossible to meet unless counsel is 
present. Nash v. Estelle, 560 F.2d 652 (5th Cir. 1977). See also United States v. Blair, 470 
F.2d 331 (5th Cir. 1972); United States v. Massey, 550 F.2d 300 (5th Cir. 1977); United 
States v. Priest, 409 F.2d 491 (5th Cir. 1969). The Ninth Circuit has held that the right to 
counsel may be waived under the Mosely standard. U.S. v. Rodriguez-Gastelum, 569 F.2d 
482 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 98 S. Ct. 2266 (1978). Other cases have decided the issue without 
considering it as directly as these cases. See United States v. Charlton, 565 F.2d 86 (6th Cir. 
1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1070 (1978); United States v. Massey, 550 F.2d 300 (5th Cir. 
1977); United States v. Boston, 508 F.2d 1171 (2d Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 1001 
(1975); United States v. Mandley, 502 F.2d 1103 (9th Cir. 1974); United States v. Tucker, 
435 F.2d 1017 (9th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 976 (1971). 
147 See notes 132-33 and accompanying text supra. 
148 430 U.S. at 435-36. The cases cited by Justice White for the proposition are cited at 
note 142 supra. These cases do indicate that a waiver may be implied by acts, but none of 
them suggest such a conclusion after the suspect has once asserted his right to counsel. 
149 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. at 469 ("The circumstances surrounding in-custody in-
terrogation can operate very quickly to overbear the will of one merely made aware of his 
privilege by his interrogators. Therefore, the right to have counsel present at the interroga-
tion is indispensible to the protection of the Fifth Amendment privilege under the system we 
delineate today. Our aim is to assure that the individual's right to choose between silence 
and speech remains unfettered .... "). 
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under the Williams-Kirby doctrine, 150 one cannot thereafter as-
sume that the suspect's actions are intelligent. The request for 
counsel constitutes an open expression of inability on the part of 
the suspect to protect his own interests. This inability is com-
pounded by the reality that the only source of information available 
to the suspect is from the government agent. Thus, there is no way 
to assume that after the suspect says he lacks the capability to 
choose he has somehow regained that capability .151 The Court 
must either provide an attorney or possibly measure the waiver by 
the at-trial standard and ask if the suspect has the intelligence to 
decide in fact. 
A second troubling aspect of this implied waiver standard is that 
it establishes a dichotomy between Miranda and Williams. 152 Wil-
liams rejects the argument that a suspect can impliedly waive his 
1• 0 Such a presumption arises, for example, where the suspect is faced with the "in-
tricacies" of criminal law. See note 97 supra. 
1• 1 Justice White, concurring in the result in Michigan v. Mosley, 423 U.S. 96, ll0 n.2 
(1975), explains: 
[T]he reasons to keep the lines of communication between the authorities and the 
accused open when the accused has chosen to make his own decisions are not pre-
sent when he indicates instead that he wishes legal advice with respect thereto. The 
authorities may then communicate with him through an attorney. More to the 
point, the accused having expressed his own view that he is not competent to deal 
with the authorities without legal advice, a later decision at the authorities' insis-
tence to make a statement without counsel's presence may properly be viewed with 
skepticism. 
This statement haunted Justice White in Williams. He argued it was inapplicable for two 
reasons. First, Williams did not indicate a desire to be free of questions outside the presence 
of counsel. B"ut Williams' statement that he would tell all after he consulted with his Des 
Moines attorney was an indication that he did not wish to speak to Leaming. Furthermore, 
Justice White's argument suggests that a suspect must not only assert his desire for counsel 
but also ask that in counsel's absence no questions be asked of him. Yet Miranda states that 
the right to counsel assertion alone must stop the interrogation. See note 144 supra. Second, 
Justice White argued that the Christian Burial Speech was not an interrogation. This argu-
ment is relevant only if one accepts his assumption that the case should be decided on 
Miranda grounds. Williams does not require interrogation. Even if it were a Miranda case, 
the argument is unpersuasive, for Miranda stated: "Any evidence that the accused was 
threatened, tricked or cajoled into a waiver will, of course, show that the defendant did not 
voluntarily waive his privilege." 384 U.S. at 476. 
Justice White observed in his dissent that the only basis for the majority decision is that it 
distinguishes between being asked a question (the right to counsel) and being protected from 
answering a question (Miranda). This he described as a "wafer-thin distinction" which can-
not determine whether a guilty murderer should go free. 430 U.S. at 436. Clearly, however, 
the asking of the question is the means by which the police both interfere with the right to 
counsel and compel a response in violation of the fifth amendment. The answer is merely the 
intended result. Whether the distinction can withstand the attack that it frees a guilty mur-
derer depends both upon the importance one attaches to the right to counsel and the impor-
tance one attaches to any other procedural limitation upon the police. 
152 This dichotomy has been recognized by several courts which have relied upon the 
Massiah doctrine when Miranda appeared to provide less protection. See United States v. 
Miller, 432 F. Supp. 382, 387-88 (E.D.N.Y. 1977), aff d without opinion, 573 F.2d 1297 (3d 
Cir. 1978); United States v. Satterfield, 417 F. Supp. 293 (S.D.N.Y. 1976); United States ex 
rel. Lopez v. Zelker, 344 F. Supp. 1050, 1054 (S.D.N.Y.), affd without opinion, 465 F.2d 
1405 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1049 (1972); United States v. Massimo, 432 F.2d 324, 
327 (2d Cir. 1970) (Friendly, C.J., dissenting). 
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right to counsel. The difference may be explained by stating that 
Williams protects sixth amendment rights, whereas Miranda pro-
tects fifth amendment rights. It is better, however, to view 
Miranda as giving the suspect the freedom to decide. This is the 
same purpose the sixth amendment fulfills for all other rights, and 
the waiver of its protections should be measured as it is in other 
sixth amendment situations.153 Justice White is correct in noting 
that there should be no difference in the standard for waiver be-
tween Miranda and Williams - but the standard chosen should be 
that of Williams and not implied waiver. 154 
IV. TOWARD A UNIFIED THEORY 
OF THE RIGHT TO COUNSEL 
Throughout the article it has been suggested that Miranda and 
Williams are closely related doctrines. Where differences in appli-
cation have occurred they have been due to the view that Miran-
da's focus is on compulsion whereas Williams' focus is on the abil-
ity of the suspect to assert his right to counsel. It is suggested that a 
unified theory can be constructed. 
It is essential to a unified theory that Miranda be re-analysed. It 
has been viewed by the Court as a mechanism to protect fifth 
amendment rights alone. Since the key to the fifth amendment is 
compulsion, the Court could apply its protections earlier in the 
criminal process than the right to counsel and rely on a less strict 
standard for waiver. There is, however, a sixth amendment side to 
Miranda which is not tied to the presence of compulsion. In refer-
ring to the need for counsel the Court noted that the attorney's 
presence was necessary to allow the suspect freedom to choose 
whether to speak to the police.155 This concept appears to be no 
different than the view expressed that the freedom to interpose 
counsel was protected by Massiah. It can be argued, therefore, 
that Miranda applies the sixth amendment for the more limited 
purpose of protecting the suspect's ability to cut off questioning. 156 
The focus is not on the compulsion but on the ability to assert the 
right. 
153 See United States v. Wendra, 343 F. Supp. 1183 (S.D.N. Y. 1972) (rejecting an implied 
waiver of right to counsel under Miranda). 
154 It is interesting to note that in Williams the Court's discussion of the proper standard 
for waiver quotes from the lower court's discussion of Miranda. This suggests that whatever 
standard is eventually established, it should be the same under either doctrine. 
155 384 U.S. at 469 ("Therefore, the right to have counsel present at the interrogation is 
indispensible to the protection of the Fifth Amendment privilege under the system we de-
lineate today. Our aim is to assure that the individual's right to choose between silence and 
speech remain unfettered .... ") (emphasis added). 
156 There are several other aspects of Miranda which suggest its reliance on the sixth 
amendment. First, the decision notes that custodial interrogation was what the Court meant 
142 Journal of Law Reform [VOL. 12:1 
This focus is an important factor in strengthening Miranda. The 
Miranda warnings are not suggestions of rights which can be used 
by the suspect, they are descriptions of rights the suspect already 
has and of which he may choose to remind the police. 157 Thus, the 
presence of compulsion may be important in deciding whether the 
Miranda doctrine applies. Once applicable, the focus of decision 
shifts to grounds closely related to sixth amendment decision -
whether the suspect had the ability to use his rights as a barrier. 
Taking this view, the difficulties which arise in the interaction 
between Miranda and Williams can be more easily resolved. Once 
a suspect is in custody, the term "interrogation" in Miranda 
should be read as broadly as it is meant in Massiah or Williams. 
Custody creates the potential for compulsion because the police 
are in control and any post-facto judgments must rely on their ver-
sion of the facts. The custody factor still distinguishes the doctrines 
but it is the only distinguishing characteristic. The time at which 
the right to counsel attaches is at custodial interrogation or, in the 
absence of custodial interrogation, at the initiation of judicial pro-
ceedings. The Court may still wish to assume that the prosecution 
represents a greater threat to-the suspect after judicial proceedings 
have begun and on that basis apply a proscription to non-custodial 
conduct. The right to counsel may be waived only under the strict 
standard of Williams. The doctrine of implied waiver, based on the 
absence of compulsion, is inapplicable. The potential for compul-
sion signals the availability of the right, and, once available, the 
waiver of the right to counsel under Miranda is theoretically no dif-
ferent than a waiver under Williams. The fact that a suspect "as-
serts" his right to counsel should make no legal difference, but it 
presents an important factual distinction. Once the right is as-
serted, the Court should not thereafter assume that a suspect can 
by "focus" in Escobedo. The Escobedo decision clearly relies on the right to counsel for 
protection. As the Court stated: "We have undertaken a thorough re-examination of the Es-
cobedo decision and the principles it announced, and we reaffirm it. That case was but an 
explication of basic rights that are enshrined in our Constitution - that 'No person ... shall 
be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself,' and that 'the accused 
shall ... have the Assistance of Counsel ... .' " 384 U.S. at 442 (emphasis added). 
Second, the Court noted that custodial interrogation represented the point at which crimi-
nal adversarial proceedings begin. 384 U.S. at 477. Although these are not judicial proceed-
ings, it is notable that the law in Miranda was involved with removing the fifth amendment 
from the limitation of judicial presence and felt that custody was the significant turning point 
for the criminal process. 
157 See, e.g., Miranda v Arizona, 384 U.S. at 471 ("In Carnley v. Cochran ... we stated: 
'[l]t is settled that where the assistance of counsel is a constitutional requisite, the right to be 
furnished counsel does not depend on request.' This proposition applies with equal force in 
the context of providing counsel to protect an accused's Fifth Amendment privilege in the 
face of interrogation .... Accordingly we hold that an individual held for interrogation must 
be clearly informed that he has the right to consult with a lawyer .... "). 
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regain the necessary intelligence to decide what is in his own best 
interests and should require the presence of an attorney before a 
waiver will be accepted. 
CONCLUSION 
At present there are two sets of protections available to the ac-
cused who has made self-incriminating remarks: those under 
Miranda and those under Williams. A study of these protections 
suggests that they are theoretically very close. Nevertheless, there 
are differences in the applicability of either set of protections. Wil-
liams proscribes all deliberate elicitations, while Miranda strikes 
out at the narrower range of police conduct involving interroga-
tions. The latter requires the presence of coercion, the former re-
quires only an interference with the ability of the suspect to inter-
pose his attorney between himself and the state. 
Williams declared that the right to counsel commences when ju-
dicial proceedings such as arraignment or a warrant for arrest have 
been initiated. Miranda rights may attach before that. These dif-
ferences are perhaps reconciled by interpreting Miranda as nothing 
more than a fifth amendment case. But they may be better recon-
ciled by recognizing Miranda as a "limited purpose" sixth 
amendment rule. 
Williams adopts a strict standard for waiver, although it may not 
be so strict as to require the presence of counsel before a waiver 
can be accepted. Williams suggests that a waiver must be express 
and it will not be found after an interrogation unless there are 
further warnings. Some have argued that there is a lesser standard 
for waiver under Miranda, but there is no reason that the two 
standards of waiver should not be the same. 
To avoid the theoretical and practical confusion which Williams 
and Miranda may create, this article has proposed a unified rule. 
Under that approach, Miranda is to be viewed as an application of 
the sixth amendment, but applicable only where fifth amendment 
rights are threatened. 
-Mitchell Leibson Chyette 
